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Abstract 
 
Does market competition reduce hospital charges and length of stay for 
the degenerative lumbar spinal disease? 
 
Medical care utilization and expenditure for patients with degenerative lumbar spinal 
(DLS) disease in Korea have continuously increased. In addition, the charges for lumbar 
spine surgery admission have a wide variance depending on the type of hospital and 
average length of stay (LOS). Concurrently, higher competition caused by the growth of 
general and specialized hospitals may have influenced recent trends in DLS treatments. 
However, there is limited empirical evidence on whether market competition leads to an 
overall improvement in efficiency. 
This study examines whether hospital market competition is associated with charges 
and LOS for patients with DLS disease. The conceptual framework of this study is 
derived from the field of industrial organization, in which market structure (i.e., the 
number of hospitals, distribution, and market-entry barriers) is assumed to affect the 
behaviors of hospital service providers and eventually disease outcomes. 
This study used nationwide cohort sample data of health insurance claims and 
patient discharge data by the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) and the Korea 
Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA) for DLS disease in 2002 and 2010. In 
total, 24,768 subjects (4,891 in 2002 and 19,877 in 2010) were analyzed. To measure the 
market competition level, the Hirschmann–Herfindahl Index (HHI) was used. After 
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adjusting for confounders in the Structure–Conduct–Performance (S–C–P) model, we 
created a mixed linear model using hospital competition as the principle independent 
variable and charges and LOS as the dependent variables.  
The total average charge was 306,351 won in 2002 and 250,723 won in 2010. 
Furthermore, the average LOS was 2.98 days in 2002 and 2.79 days in 2010. In addition, 
we found that the HHI was associated with hospital charges and LOS for DLS disease. 
The HHI showed a significant association with higher total charges (in 1,000 won) among 
inpatients with DLS disease in 2002 and 2010. The HHI was also associated with longer 
LOS for DLS disease. Compared to low competition level (high HHI), high competition 
level (low HHI) was associated with both lower charges and shorter LOS. In addition, the 
results of the subgroup analysis for patients without comorbidity and those of analysis for 
all patients pointed in the same direction. For hospitals with 300 beds or less, higher 
competition is associated with increases in charges and LOS in both 2002 and 2010. By 
contrast, in hospitals with more than 300 beds, higher market competition reduced 
charges over time. 
This empirical study showed that hospital market structure (e.g., hospital 
competition) affects hospital efficiency (i.e., hospital charges and LOS). Therefore, the 
government must keep an eye on the changing hospital market structure that influences 
hospital outcomes. Future studies should investigate more detailed effects of competition 
on DLS disease outcomes, such as patient satisfaction. 
 
Keywords: hospital competition, Hirschmann–Herfindahl Index, hospital charges, length 
of stay
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, the socioeconomic cost of surgery for disease of lumbar spine has 
increased dramatically (Bederman, 2009). Medical care utilization and expenditure for 
spinal surgery in South Korea (Korea henceforth) have more than doubled in the period 
2002–2007. While the average annual rate of increase in spinal surgeries in the United 
States was 4.54% over the past 11 years, the rate in Korea was 25.36% during the past 3 
years (Health Insurance Review & Assessment Service (HIRA), 2009). Moreover, the 
lumbar region accounts for most spinal surgeries according to health insurance claims 
(HIRA, 2007). 
Medical care utilization and expenditure for patients with DLS disease in Korea have 
continuously increased. In addition, the charges for lumbar spinal surgery admission vary 
widely depending on the type of hospital and the average length of stay (LOS), which is 
much lengthier in Korea than in other countries (HIRA, 2014). However, higher 
competition between hospitals owing to the increased number of general and specialized 
hospitals may have influenced recent DLS treatment trends. As a result, hospital 
efficiency fluctuates. An OECD committee discussed the role of hospital competition in 
healthcare expenditures in 2012 (OECD Competition Law & Policy, 2012). Total 
expenditure on healthcare amounts to 7.6% of GDP in Korea, which is lower than the 
OECD average of 9.3%. However, in recent years, high-spending OECD countries have 
lowered the rate of increase in healthcare spending by developing efficient healthcare 
policies. On the other hand, in Korea, the annual growth rate of total expenditures on 
 -２- 
 
healthcare is still high (OECD, 2014). Thus, using competition as a mechanism for costs, 
quantity and quality controls should be considered to resolve these increases in healthcare 
spending (Maier-Rigaud, 2012).  
It is necessary to investigate long-term changes in competition to analyze the 
competitive behavior of hospitals (Feldstein, 2004). However, most studies on the subject 
have utilized short-term data. Therefore, in this paper, we used cohort data from 2002 and 
2010 in Korea to determine changes in market competition and their effects. The aim of 
this study is to verify how hospital market competition is associated with hospital charges 
and LOS.  
  
 -３- 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1. Hospital competition 
Competition in the healthcare market has intensified over the last few decades (Vogt & 
Town, 2006; Kim et al., 2014). In economics, competition refers to the rivalry between 
parties such as individuals or groups that arises whenever at least two of the parties strive 
for something that cannot be shared (Stigler, 1987). On the other hand, hospital 
competition differs from other industries based on price competition and the principle of 
profit maximization (Noether, 1988). In general, competition leads to better performance 
in terms of improvements in quality and reductions in price. In contrast, in the medical 
industry, competition is often related to privatization. This has been a critical issue in 
Korea lately, and it can cause price fluctuations and deterioration of health outcomes 
(OECD, 2012). 
Many studies have been conducted on market competition and hospital efficiency. 
Studies using data from prior to the mid-1980s in USA mostly proposed that competition 
may result in inefficiencies in healthcare systems (Joscow, 1980; Robinson & Luft, 1985, 
1987; Farley, 1985; Luft et al., 1986; Noether, 1988). Especially because of healthcare 
insurance and payment systems, consumers were sensitive to quality rather than price, 
causing a “medical arms race” and the provision of unnecessarily expensive medical 
services (Held & Pauly, 1983; Kessler DP, 1999). Competition in the supply of high-tech 
services implied an association between hospital competition and costs (Propper, 1996). 
Some studies have found that treatment costs were higher in more competitive areas 
(Robinson & Luft, 1987; Koch, 1993; Kim et al., 2014). However, since the introduction 
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of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and managed care in the United States and the shift 
from non-price competition to price competition, it has been found that high competition 
may reduce the increasing rates of medical expenses (Melnick & Zwanziger, 1988; 
Melnick et al., 1992; Propper, 1996; Park, 2006). In this situation, growing competition 
may place strong pressure on cost reductions and improved efficiency of hospital care 
(Mayo & McFarland, 1989; Rivers & Fottler, 2004). However, some studies have found 
that cost competition is associated with deteriorating health outcomes (Kassirer, 1995; 
Mukamel, Zwanziger, & Bamezai, 2002; Volpp et al., 2003; Propper, Burgess, & Green, 
2004), whereas other studies have doubted whether hospital competition is related to 
either treatment cost or quality of hospital care (Fournier, 1992; Reinhardt, 1996; Propper, 
1997; Propper & Söderlund, 1998; Hirth, Chernew, & Orzol, 2000; Mukamel, Zwanziger, 
& Tomaszewski, 2001). 
Concerning the debate about healthcare competition and its effects, more studies on the 
subject are required (Chang, 2011). In Korea, the government has introduced and 
stimulated competition between hospitals. In this study, we attempt to find the effects of 
hospital competition on efficiency. 
 
2.2. Healthcare market in Korea 
 Unlike the United States, there is a National Health Insurance System (NHIS) in 
Korea providing universal health coverage with an average 20% copayment. In addition, 
there is a fee-for-service (FFS) hospital payment system in Korea (excluding the DRGs, 
which cover seven disease groups). The FFS, which depends on the quantity of 
treatments, affects the behavior of healthcare providers. Moreover, when patients pay for 
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part of the cost of universal health coverage, doctors may supply more treatment than 
required. Most hospitals are private, and hospitalization charges are standardized by the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW), which determines the health service areas and 
the number of hospitals in each area. Overall, 16 administrative districts are mixed and 
grouped into 10 healthcare service areas. In addition, the number of doctors, number of 
beds, and other resources are controlled by the government. 
Depending on the market structure, the effects of competition on hospital performance 
may differ. Thus, the effects in the United States differ from those in Korea.  
Most hospital competition studies conducted in Korea have focused on factors at the 
patient and hospital level as confounding variables or have used short-term data. Park 
(2006) used data from 2002 to 2003 and adjusted only hospital-level factors as 
confounding variables, while Park (2008) adjusted the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the market and market structure but used data covering only 1 month of health insurance 
claims in January 2002. Kim (2012) used outpatient health insurance claims in 2010 and 
adjusted the socioeconomic characteristics of the market (i.e., education level, population 
density, the ratio of persons 65 years of age or older, and per-capita GDP) as market-level 
confounding variables. Kim et al. (2014) used data from November 1
st
, 2011 to May 31
st
, 
2012 on adjusted per-capita GRDP as the market-level confounding variable. While these 
studies used short-term data or a partially adjusted market-level confounding factor, the 
current study used cohort data from health insurance claims in 2002 and 2010 as the main 
data as well as adjusted socioeconomic characteristics of the market (i.e., population 
density, taxes, and education level) and hospital market structure (i.e., number of beds 
and doctors). 
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2.3. Defining the hospital market 
2.3.1. Cross-elasticity of demand 
Cross-elasticity of demand is measured as the % change of demand for a product to 
the % change in price of another product. In economics, firms are in the same market if 
they affect mutual pricing and production decisions (Palamgkaraya & Yong, 2009). Some 
studies have proposed that cross-elasticity of demand can contribute to defining markets 
in terms of price or non-price variables of interest (Luft et al., 1989). However, this 
approach is not feasible for hospital markets, because hospital price data is usually 
unavailable (Gaynor & Vogt, 2003). 
 
2.3.2. The Elzinga–Hogarty (E–H) method 
A well-known approach that uses product flow information is that proposed by Elzinga 
and Hogarty (1973). They suggested to set markets as geographic areas if the 
consumption produced outside is not more than 10% (i.e., little in from outside (LIFO)) 
and if production consumed outside is not more than 10% (i.e., little out from inside 
(LOFI)). Insignificant patient flows indicate that hospitals in one area are not in 
competition with hospitals in other areas (Econex, 2006). The E–H approach is 
conceptually compelling, but some limitations exist in applying the approach (Gaynor & 
Vogt, 2000; Dranove & White, 1994; Zwanziger, Melnick, & Eyre, 1994), which requires 
the location of both patients and hospitals (Dranove, Shanley, & Simon, 1992), and there 
is a practical problem of market overlap. If markets overlap, the decision on the extent of 
overlap is arbitrary (Dranove, Shanley, & White, 1993). 
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2.3.3. Geopolitical boundaries 
Geopolitical boundaries using geopolitical units are the most easily employed (Romeo 
et al., 1984; Lynk, 1995; Gaynor & Vogt, 2000; Schneider, 2008; USA Department of 
Commerce, 2012). This approach is attractive because it is simple to calculate and does 
not require patient flow information. The other advantage of using geopolitical 
boundaries to define market areas is the availability of socioeconomic data (Garnick et al., 
1987). On the other hand, a disadvantage of using geopolitical boundaries is that hospital 
market areas may be arbitrarily defined (Vistness, 1995; Kleiner, 2012). If market areas 
are grouped by administrative district with a high degree of socioeconomic cohesion, the 
competition level can be overestimated or underestimated (Zwanziger, Melnick, & Eyre, 
1994). In addition, the approach cannot be applied to structure–conduct–performance (S–
C–P) studies (Park, 2006). Nevertheless, many previous studies in Korea used the 
approach to define hospital market areas (Sagong & Kown, 2011; Kim, 2012; Kim et al., 
2014). 
 
2.3.4. Fixed radius 
The fixed-radius approach is an alternative to geopolitical boundaries. This approach, 
proposed by Luft and Maerki (1984), uses a fixed radius around each hospital. The study 
by Jo, Lim, and Lee (2008) implemented the approach for Korea. Because the fixed 
radius is settled with a circle centered on each hospital, the advantage of the fixed-radius 
method is that it can include competitors located outside geopolitical boundaries. Luft 
and Maerki (1984) recommended fixing the radius to no more than 15 miles. However, 
fixing the radius is a weakness of the approach, because the size of markets differs 
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depending on the hospital type (Zwangziger, Melnick, & Mann, 1990).  
 
2.3.5. Variable radius 
 Phibbs & Robinson (1993) proposed the variable-radius approach as an alternative 
method to the fixed-radius approach, and Gresenz et al. (2004) updated it. Under the 
approach, hospital market areas vary in size, while a market is defined as a radius around 
each hospital, like the fixed-radius approach. However, compensating for the defects of 
the fixed-radius approach, the variable-radius approach allows the radius to vary so that it 
captures 75% or 90% of the patients. A unique hospital market area is defined for every 
hospital using this approach (Wong et al., 2005). 
 
2.3.6. Patient flow 
 The patient flow approach uses patient origination data and defines market areas as a 
collection of ZIP codes that send a certain percentage of patients (e.g., 40–95% of 
hospital discharge patients) to hospitals in the area (Garnick et al., 1987; Zwanziger & 
Melnick, 1988). The approach disregards areas that house a low percentage of hospital 
discharge patients (i.e., 1–3% or less; Zwangziger, Melnick, & Mann, 1990; Korea 
Institute for Health and Social Affairs, 2013). The advantage of this approach is that it can 
assess the relationship among the structure, conduct, and performance of hospitals by 
calculating the competition level of each hospital (Park, 2006). 
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2.4. Measuring hospital competition level 
2.4.1. Number of hospitals 
 After defining the hospital market area, a measure for hospital competition must be 
decided. The number of hospitals is a method used frequently for studies defining market 
areas as a certain radius centered on the hospital. The advantage of the method is 
computational ease. On the other hand, it does not consider differences in the size of 
hospitals and market share (Baker, 2001).  
 
2.4.2. The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 
 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used to reflect the differences in hospital 
market share and has been used as an indicator of competition level among hospitals as an 
alternative to the number of hospitals. The HHI sums the squared market shares of each 
hospital in a market (Feldstein, 2004), and the market shares are usually calculated from 
the number of discharges (Zwangziger, Melnick, & Mann, 1990). The HHI is the 
preferred method in the healthcare industry, because it reflects both the number of 
competitors and the distribution of market shares. However, there exists a practical 
problem in that it is difficult to obtain available data to accurately calculate the HHI (Noh 
et al., 2007). Patient and hospital market data must be connected, and hospital data must 
include all hospitals in the market area (Palankaraya & Yong, 2009). Nevertheless, the 
HHI is the standard method for measuring market competition. 
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2.4.3. Concentration ratio 
Another method of measuring hospital competition intensity in a market is a 
concentration ratio. Common concentration ratios that measure dispersion of market 
shares are typically CR4 and CR8, indicating dispersion of market shares of the largest 
four or eight hospitals, respectively. Thus, this method has limited information (Wong et 
al., 2005; Park, 2006). 
 
2.5. Theoretical foundation 
In the field of industrial organization, market structure affects the behaviors of 
providers and eventually the outcomes (Lee, 2001). The S–C–P paradigm of industrial 
organization can be also applied to the healthcare industry. Thus, the conceptual 
framework of this study is derived from the field of industrial organization, in which the 
market structure (i.e., the number and distribution of hospitals, which are barriers to 
market entry) is assumed to affect the behaviors of hospital service providers and 
eventually the outcomes (Figure 1). 
Many studies that examine the impact of hospital market competition on patient 
outcomes have used the S–C–P theory as a mechanism (Gaynor & Vogt, 2003; Rivers & 
Fottler, 2004; Vogt & Town, 2006; Hearld et al., 2008; Park, Kwon & Jung, 2008). 
Furthermore, previous studies have indicated that outcomes depend on characteristics of 
multilevel factors (i.e., patients, hospitals, and socioeconomic environment characteristics; 
Rivers & Fottler, 2004; Burgess, 2005). Some studies have also suggested that the effect 
of competition differs depending on the market structure (Sari, 2002; Burns et al. 2005; 
Vogt & Town, 2006; Park, Kwon & Jung, 2008). 
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Fig. 1. Modified S–C–P model.  
 
Using the modified S-C-P framework, this study divided structure into socioeconomic 
characteristics and hospital market structure (Scherer & Ross, 1990). Considering the 
possibility of endogenous variables, we first analyzed the association between 
socioeconomic characteristics and market competition. Then, we excluded socioeconomic 
characteristics and analyzed the associations between market competition and hospital 
charges and LOS. Conduct indicates the behavior of hospitals and includes hospital type, 
ownership type, number of beds, number of doctors, and technology, whereas 
performance indicates the effect of market structure on hospital efficiency. The S–C–P 
framework hypothesizes that structure affects the conduct of hospitals and ultimately 
performance (Gaynor, 2006). 
  
Structure Conduct Performance 
Socioeconomic 
prospects of the area 
 -Population density 
 -Tax 
 -Educational level 
Market structure 
 -Hospital competition 
 -Number of beds in   
   clinic 
 -Number of doctors 
Institutional 
 -Hospital classification 
 -Ownership status 
 -Number of beds 
 -Number of doctors 
 -Medical equipment 
Patient 
 -Gender 
 -Age 
 -Income 
 -Comorbidity 
 -Procedure 
Outcomes 
 -Charges 
 -Length of stay 
 -１２- 
 
3. Methods 
 
3.1. Data source and study sample 
We used nationwide cohort sample data of health insurance claims by the NHIS as our 
main data as well as patient discharge data by the MOHW and the KIHASA to calculate 
the HHI in 2002 and 2010. Variables for market structure were calculated using data from 
the Korea National Statistical Office (KOSTAT). Only patients who were hospitalized 
with DLS disease were included in this study. The sample consisted of 4,891 persons in 
2002 and 19,877 persons in 2010. In total, there were 2,208 patients without comorbidity 
in 2002 and 6,400 in 2010. In addition, 995 patients in 2002 and 4,521 in 2010 were 
admitted to hospitals with 300 or less beds among those without comorbidity. Those 
admitted to hospitals with more than 300 beds numbered 1,267 in 2002 and 2,098 in 2010. 
 
3.2. Case selection 
 The subjects of this study included only those with DLS disease. Thus, they were 
defined using primary diagnostic codes in medical statements. The following codes were 
analyzed: “other intervertebral disc disorders,” “spinal stenosis,” “specified 
spondylopathies,” “spondylopathies,” “spondylolysis,” “other fusion of spine,” and 
“deforming dorsopathies.”  
Both operative and nonoperative treatments were included for patients with DLS 
disease. Therefore, the types of surgery included in this study were arthrodesis for spinal 
deformity, arthrodesis of spine, diskectomy, and laminectomy (Table 1).  
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Table 1. List of surgical procedures 
List of surgical procedures 
Medical procedure 
code 
Arthrodesis 
for spinal 
deformity 
Anterior technique  N0444 
 N0445 
Posterior technique  N0446 
 N0447 
Arthrodesis of 
spine 
Anterior technique (Lumbar spine) N0466 
Posterior technique (Lumbar spine) N0469 
Diskectomy Invasive (Lumbar spine) N1493 
By endoscopy  N1494 
Injection procedure for 
chemonucleolysis 
 N1495 
Aspiration procedure of 
nucleus pulposus of 
intervertebral disk 
 N1496 
Laminectomy  (Lumbar spine) N1499 
 
3.3. Variables 
3.3.1. Dependent variables 
The dependent variables and their definition sources are shown in Table 2. Total 
charges and LOS were considered in measuring hospital performance in 2002 and in 
2010. “Total charges” are the total payments for each year, and “Total LOS” indicates the 
total LOS for each year. 
 
3.3.2. Independent variables 
Table 2 shows the main independent variable and the control variables. Patient 
variables include gender, age, income, disease diagnosis, comorbidity, and procedure 
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(surgery or nonoperative treatments). Institutional variables include hospital classification 
(teaching/general hospital or small hospital), ownership status (public or private), number 
of beds, number of doctors, and medical equipment (CT and/or MRI). 
Regional-level variables include socioeconomic variables and hospital market ones. 
The main independent variable was the HHI for hospital markets. To calculate the HHI, 
we measured markets using the patient flow approach. The maximum cutoff value of the 
market area is 80% of a hospital's patients, and the marginal value is 1% of its patients 
(Zwangziger, Melnick, & Mann, 1990). Following the study by Korea Institute for Health 
and Social Affairs (2013), we calculated the HHI along with patient discharge data for the 
zip code of residence and institutional data for the hospital administrative district and the 
number of discharges. Then, we divided the hospital market depending on the health 
service area to analyze the HHI. In this study, regional-level variables were divided by 
health service area, and the MW determined 10 health service areas reflecting past 
hospital utilization patterns. Socioeconomic variable used include population density, tax, 
and education level. Hospital market variables include hospital competition level, number 
of beds in the clinic, and number of doctors. 
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Table 2. Variables, definitions, and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Outcome variables   
Charges Total charge (per 1,000won) NHIS 
Length of stay(LOS) Total length of stay  NHIS 
Patient    
Gender Male, female NHIS 
Age Less than 40, 40~64, 65 and more NHIS 
Income Quintiles of Income divided  
by health insurance premium  
per family unit 
NHIS 
Comorbidity Comorbidity status on medical statement NHIS 
Procedure The number of surgery for degenerative 
lumbar spine  
NHIS 
Institutional    
Hospital classification Teaching hospital or general hospital, Small 
hospital 
NHIS 
Ownership status Public, Private NHIS 
Number of beds 30~300, 301~500, 501~1000, 1001~1500, 
1500 and more 
NHIS 
Number of doctors Number of doctors of each hospital NHIS 
Medical equipment CT, MRI NHIS 
Socioeconomic prospects  
of the area 
  
Population density People per square kilometer KOSTAT 
Tax Local tax (per 1,000,000won) KOSTAT 
Education level College graduation rate KOSTAT 
Market structure    
Hirschmann-Herfindahl  
Index(HHI) 
Summing the squared market shares  
of each hospital in market  
(by 100 points)  
KIHASA 
Number of beds in clinic Average number of beds in clinic  
(per 1000 persons) 
KOSTAT 
Number of doctors Average number of doctors  
(per 1000 persons) 
KOSTAT 
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3.4. Analytic approach 
3.4.1. Statistical analysis 
Descriptive statistics of health service area, hospital, and patient characteristics are 
presented as follows. First, this study conducted a linear mixed model using 
socioeconomic characteristics as independent variables and hospital competition level as 
the dependent variable. Because the market competition variable could be endogenous, 
we first analyzed the association of socioeconomic characteristics with market 
competition and then that of market competition with charges and LOS excluding 
socioeconomic characteristics. After adjusting for confounders in the S–C–P model, we 
conducted a linear mixed model using hospital competition as the principle independent 
variable and charges and LOS as the dependent variables. The advantage of repeated 
measurements is that it is the only type of measurement which is available for obtaining 
individual change patterns. The equation for the linear mixed model is as follows: 
 
                                       
 
Here,  i is a regression coefficient and  i is a random effect for subject i. In this model, 
the subject can have a variety of observations, and observation times may differ among 
subjects (Davis, 2002). Because the distribution of the HHI and the number of doctors are 
skewed, a log transformation was applied to these variables. All individual patient-level, 
hospital-level, and health service-area-level data were included in our linear mixed model. 
SAS 9.4 was used for all analysis. 
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3.4.2. Subgroup analysis 
 In order to create homogeneous groups, patients with comorbidity were excluded 
from our subgroup analysis. After conducting the subgroup analysis, we divided patients 
without comorbidity by the number of beds: 300 beds or less and more than 300 beds. 
Thus, small and large hospitals are respectively classified by the number of beds. The 
classification standard for determining hospital size by the number of beds is generally 
300. 
  
 -１８- 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Patient, hospital, and market characteristics 
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics on the patient, hospital, and market 
characteristics. The average of total charges in 2002 was 306,351 won and the standard 
deviation was 1,060,712 won. The average of the total charges in 2010 was 250,723 won, 
while the standard deviation was 783,710 won. In addition, in 2002, the average LOS was 
2.98 days and the standard deviation was 4.91 days, whereas the average LOS in 2010 
was 2.79 days and the standard deviation was 4.37 days. Furthermore, the average of the 
outcome variables decreased in the period 2002–2010. Patients over 65 years old 
increased from 21.96% in 2002 to 30.41% in 2010. The number of patients by income has 
no significant change, but income is positively correlated with the patient ratio. In 
addition, the ratio of patients with comorbidity increased from 63.77 in 2002 to 77.72 in 
2010. According to a report by the HIRA, the number of spinal surgery procedures per 
100,000 persons was 327 cases in 2010. Compared with existing reference data, there 
were a similar number of DLS surgeries in this study (N = 218 in 2010). 
Next, the characteristics for number of patients by hospital are shown in Table 3. Of 
the DLS disease patients, those admitted to teaching or general hospitals decreased from 
63.78% to 37.40% in the period 2002–2010. However, those admitted to small hospitals 
increased from 36.13% in 2002 to 62.60% in 2010. The ratio of patients admitted to 
hospitals with more than 30 but fewer than 300 beds increased from 40.85 to 68.68 in 
2002–2010, but the ratio of patients admitted to hospitals with over 500 beds decreased. 
In addition, the number of doctors in hospitals where patients were hospitalized decreased 
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(mean = 157.43 in 2002; mean = 91.59 in 2010), and the number of patients in hospitals 
with CT scanners or MRI machines decreased over the period 2002–2010. These trends 
might be affected by the increase in the number of patients admitted to small hospitals. 
Lastly, population density, taxes, and education level increased. The reduced HHI 
during the period indicates increased competition level. The distribution of the HHI was 
extremely skewed left. All 10 population service areas located in Korea experienced 
increased competition over 2002–2010, whereas the number of beds per clinic (per 1,000 
persons) decreased and the number of doctors (per 1,000 persons) increased. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics in 2002 and 2010 
 2002 2010 
 n(%) Mean SD n(%) Mean SD 
Patient-level     
Charges
a 
 306,351 
 1,060,712 
 250,723 
 783,710 
Length of stay  2.98 
 4.91 
 2.79 
 4.37 
Gender     
Male 2,188 
(44.74) 
 8,416 
(42.34) 
 
Female 2,703 
(55.26) 
 11,461 
(57.66) 
 
Age     
Less than 40  1,259 
(25.74) 
 3,811 
(19.17) 
 
40~64 2,558 
(52.30) 
 10,022 
(50.42) 
 
65 and more 1,074 
(21.96) 
 6,044 
(30.41) 
 
Income     
Medical aid 12 
(0.25) 
 48 
(0.24) 
 
20% and less 602 
(12.31) 
 2,745 
(13.81) 
 
21~40% 741 
(15.15) 
 2,820 
(14.19) 
 
41~60% 864 
(17.67) 
 3,606 
(18.14) 
 
61~80% 1,156 
(23.64) 
 4,498 
(22.63) 
 
81% and more 1,516 
(31.00) 
 6,160 
(30.99) 
 
 
 -２１- 
 
Table 3. (continued) 
 
2002 2010 
 
n(%) Mean SD n(%) Mean SD 
Comorbidity    
 
No 1,772 
(36.23) 
 4,428 
(22.28) 
 
Yes 3,119 
(63.77) 
 15,449 
(77.72)  
Procedure    
 
Nonsurgery 98,851 
(99.92) 
 540,492 
(99.96)  
Surgery 76 
(0.08) 
 218 
(0.04)  
Hospital-level     
The number of patients by 
hospital classification 
    
Teaching hospital 
or general hospital 
3,124 
(63.87) 
 7,434 
(37.40) 
 
Small hospital 1,767 
(36.13) 
 12,443 
(62.60) 
 
The number of patients by 
ownership status 
    
Public 68 
(1.39) 
 403 
(2.03) 
 
Private 4,823 
(98.61) 
 19,474 
(97.97) 
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Table 3. (continued) 
 2002 2010 
 n(%) Mean SD n(%) Mean SD 
The number of patients by 
number of beds 
    
30~300 1,998 
(40.85) 
 13,652 
(68.68) 
 
301~500 366 
(7.48) 
 1,723 
(8.67) 
 
501~1000 1,592 
(32.55) 
 3,081 
(15.50) 
 
1001~1500 559 
(11.43) 
 836 
(4.21) 
 
1500 and more 376 
(7.69) 
 585 
(2.94) 
 
The number of doctors  157.43 
 208.04 
 91.59 
 221.84 
The number of patients by 
existence of CT 
    
No 66 
(1.35) 
 2,014 
(10.13) 
 
Yes 4825 
(98.65) 
 17,863 
(89.87) 
 
The number of patients by 
existence of MRI 
    
No 539 
(11.02) 
 2,807 
(14.12) 
 
Yes 4,352 
(88.98) 
 17,070 
(85.88) 
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Table 3. (continued) 
 2002 2010 
 n(%) Mean SD n(%) Mean SD 
Socioeconomic prospects of 
the area 
    
Population density  1,717.77 
 1,708.57 
 1,852.46 
 1,909 
Tax(per 1,000,000won)  5,544,045 
 4796299 
 6,029,569 
 1222509 
Education level  0.18 
 0.03 
 0.28 
 0.04 
Market structure      
HHI(by 100 points)  3.33 
 2.89 
 2.36 
 1.73 
The number of beds in clinic 
(per 1000 persons) 
 1.57 
 0.67 
 1.53 
 0.59 
The number of doctors  
(per 1000 persons) 
 0.69 
 0.20 
 0.95 
 0.26 
Number of patients 4,891 
(100) 
 19,877 
(100) 
 
a
Unit: Korean Won. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 shows the characteristics of socioeconomic prospects and hospital 
market structure by health service area. Of the markets for DLS disease, the capital area 
was the most competitive market with an HHI of 119.93, whereas the Kang-Won area 
was the least competitive market with an HHI of 1,298.36 in 2002. On the other hand, the 
capital area had the least number of beds and least number of doctors per 1,000 persons in 
the clinics. In terms of population density, west Gyeong-Gi was the highest and Kang-
Won was the lowest. Tax per 1,000,000 won was highest in the capital area and lowest in 
the Chung-Buk area. In terms of education level, that in the capital area was the highest 
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and that in the Kang-Won area was the lowest. The structural characteristics in 2010 
showed a similar status to those in 2002 except for the HHI: the southern Gyeong-Gi area 
had an HHI of 87.20 and was more competitive than the capital area with an HHI of 
108.32 in 2010.
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Table 4. Characteristics of structure by population service area in 2002 
population 
service areas 
N HHI 
Number of  
beds 
in clinic 
per 1000 persons 
Number of 
doctors 
per 1000 persons 
Population 
density 
Tax 
per 1,000,000won 
Education 
level 
Capital area 1392 119.93 0.77 0.49 2345 12,950,488 0.22 
West Gyeong-Gi area 513 245.81 2.33 0.72 5537 3,812,566 0.18 
South Gyeong-Gi area 430 125.53 2.12 1.01 3396 2,590,794 0.18 
Kang-Won area 224 1298.36 2.25 0.65 91 709,719 0.13 
Chung-Buk area 184 888.20 2.04 0.96 229 634,870 0.14 
Chung-Nam area 389 459.47 2.44 0.92 316 2,611,283 0.15 
Chon-Buk area 220 574.07 2.76 1.16 271 723,118 0.14 
Chon-Nam area 464 487.55 1.42 0.56 161 1,446,636 0.15 
Gyeong-Buk area 448 452.78 1.26 0.58 257 2,502,368 0.16 
Gyeong-Nam area 627 148.96 1.38 0.71 641 4,427,415 0.20 
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Table 5. Characteristics of structure by population service area in 2010 
population 
service areas 
N HHI 
Number of  
beds  
in clinic 
per 1000 persons 
Number of 
doctors 
per 1000 persons 
Population 
density 
Tax 
per 1,000,000won 
Education 
level 
Capital area 5219 108.32 0.70 0.59 2508 17,566,324 0.34 
West Gyeong-Gi area 2246 203.91 1.95 1.05 6018 5,527,400 0.28 
South Gyeong-Gi area 1543 87.20 1.94 1.39 3987 4,435,583 0.29 
Kang-Won area 589 875.09 2.08 0.89 89 1,222,509 0.21 
Chung-Buk area 518 674.61 1.99 1.13 243 1,257,957 0.22 
Chung-Nam area 1463 425.62 2.49 1.09 342 3,122,884 0.24 
Chon-Buk area 857 449.22 2.56 1.46 260 1,296,431 0.24 
Chon-Nam area 1649 317.28 1.63 0.94 149 2,522,230 0.24 
Gyeong-Buk area 2187 273.03 1.36 0.83 254 3,845,402 0.24 
Gyeong-Nam area 3606 148.44 1.54 1.08 655 7,602,490 0.29 
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4.2. Linear mixed-model analysis 
Tables 6, 7, and 8 show the result of a linear mixed-model analysis. The association 
between socioeconomic characteristics of the market and HHI in 2002 and 2010 are 
indicated in Table 6. Population density and education level showed a negative 
association with the HHI (p < .001), whereas tax showed a positive association with it (p 
< .001). The result indicated that hospitals considered population an important factor for 
location (Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Linear mixed model: association of market socioeconomic characteristics with 
the HHI in 2002 and 2010 
 
2002 2010 
 
  p-value   p-value 
Socioeconomic characteristics of the 
market 
    
Population density -0.053 <.0001 -0.048 <.0001 
Tax(per 1,000,000won) 0.271 <.0001 0.131 <.0001 
Education level -5.158 <.0001 -4.357 <.0001 
  
  
Table 7 shows the results of the linear mixed-model analysis for charges. First, the 
association between charges and the HHI is shown in the table. This value has increased 
significantly over the period 2002–2010 (  = 103.17, p < .0001 in 2002;   = 116.52, p 
< .0001 in 2010). Furthermore, the association between charges and patient 
characteristics are shown in Table 7. Charges were higher for patients older than 40 but 
younger than 65 compared with patients less than 40 years of age in both 2002 and 2010 
(  = 559.57, p < .0001 in 2002;   = 374.08, p < .0001 in 2010). On the other hand, 
patients 65 years of age or older showed an increased association with higher charges in 
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2002–2010 (  = 382.08, p < .0001 in 2002;   = 845.28, p < .0001 in 2010). In addition, 
charges were significantly higher for patients with comorbidity (  = 1,296.72, p < .0001 
in 2002;   = 1,002.74, p < .0001 in 2010). Total charges showed a significant 
association with surgery procedures (  = 4,649.86, p < .0001 in 2002;   = 4,296.34, p 
< .0001 in 2010). 
The association between charges and hospital characteristics are shown in Table 7. 
Total charges were significantly lower for small hospitals compared with teaching or 
general hospitals in 2002 (  = -266.81, p < .0001) but higher in 2010 (  = 221.25, p 
< .0001). Charges were higher for private hospitals compared with public hospitals, and 
the association between charges and hospital ownership status increased over the period 
2002–2010 (  = 333.22, p = 0.0044 in 2002;   = 181.21, p < .0001 in 2010). On the 
other hand, the number of doctors was positively associated with charge amount (  = 
432.06, p < .0001 in 2002;   = 418.10, p < .0001 in 2010). 
Finally, Table 7 shows the association between charges and regional characteristics. A 
higher number of beds in the clinic (per 1,000 persons) led to higher charges in 2002 (  
= 303.94, p < .0001) but lower charges in 2010 (  = -123.88, p < .0001). More doctors 
(per 1,000 persons) showed a significant association with lower charges in 2002 (  = -
0.415, p < .0001), whereas they led to higher charges in 2010 (  = 418.81, p < .0001). 
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Table 7. Linear mixed model: association between the HHI and charges (in 1,000 won) in 
2002 and 2010 
 2002 2010 
   p-value   p-value 
Main interest     
HHI(by 100 points) 103.17 <.0001 116.52 <.0001 
Patient-level     
Gender     
Male     
Female 274.69 <.0001 90.4910 <.0001 
Age     
Less than 40      
40~64 559.57 <.0001 374.08 <.0001 
65 and more 382.08 <.0001 845.28 <.0001 
Income     
Medical aid     
20% and less 473.98 0.0002 549.43 <.0001 
21~40% 611.04 <.0001 353.22 <.0001 
41~60% 289.15 0.0199 541.90 <.0001 
61~80% 231.23 0.0618 447.86 <.0001 
81% and more 291.22 0.0187 258.83 <.0001 
Comorbidity     
No     
Yes 1296.72 <.0001 1002.74 <.0001 
Procedure     
Nonsurgery     
Surgery 4649.86 <.0001 4296.34 <.0001 
Hospital-level     
Hospital classification     
Teaching hospital 
or general hospital 
    
Small hospital -266.81 <.0001 221.25 <.0001 
Ownership status     
Public     
Private 333.22 <.0001 181.21 <.0001 
Number of beds     
30~300     
301~500 -400.54 <.0001 -115.47 <.0001 
501~1000 -254.03 <.0001 -84.47 <.0001 
1001~1500 -457.94 <.0001 -315.11 <.0001 
1500 and more -624.61 <.0001 -106.82 <.0001 
Number of doctors 432.06 <.0001 418.10 <.0001 
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Table 7. (continued)  
 2002 2010 
   p-value   p-value 
CT     
No     
Yes -714.49 <.0001 -114.93 <.0001 
MRI     
No     
Yes -116.78 0.0005 457.23 <.0001 
Regional-level     
Number of beds in clinic 
(per 1000 persons) 
303.94 <.0001 -123.88 <.0001 
Number of doctors  
(per 1000 persons) 
-32.16 0.6770 418.81 <.0001 
 
The results of the linear mixed-model analysis on LOS are shown in Table 8. First, the 
table shows the association between LOS and the HHI. This figure decreased in the 
period 2002–2010 (  = 0.89, p < .0001 in 2002;   = 0.25, p < .0001 in 2010). Table 8 also 
shows the association between LOS and patient characteristics. LOS for females was 
higher than that for males in 2002 and 2010 (  = 0.49, p < .0001 in 2002;   = 0.43, p 
< .0001 in 2010). The association between LOS and age increased with charges in both 
years, and higher income levels showed a significant association with lower LOS in 2010. 
In addition, LOS showed a significant association with comorbidity (  = 5.37, p < .0001 
in 2002;   = 4.79, p < .0001 in 2010). LOS was significantly higher for patients 
undergoing surgery procedures (  = 6.04, p < .0001 in 2002;   = 11.02, p < .0001 in 
2010). 
Next, the association between LOS and hospital characteristics is shown in Table 8. 
LOS was significantly lower for small hospitals than for teaching or general hospitals in 
2002 and 2010 (  = -2.01, p < .0001 in 2002;   = -0.72, p < .0001 in 2010). The 
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association between LOS and number of beds showed a different distribution than that 
between number of beds and charges. That is, the LOS fluctuated with the number of 
beds in 2010. According to the theory of economies of scale, cost falls when hospital size 
increases. Furthermore, the theoretical relationship between number of beds and hospital 
cost is U-shaped (Feldstein, 2004). Thus, the theory implies that the association between 
LOS and number of beds might be curved shape. On the other hand, the increased 
number of doctors had a negative association with LOS (  = -0.016, p = 0.002 in 2002;   
= -0.009, p = 0.001 in 2010). 
Finally, the table shows the association of LOS with regional characteristics. More 
beds in a clinic (per 1,000 persons) showed a negative association with LOS in 2002 (  = 
-0.36, p = 0.0243). In addition, an increase in the number of doctors (per 1,000 persons) 
led to a longer LOS while the association between the number of doctors and LOS 
decreased over time (  = 1.24, p < .0001 in 2002;   = 0.37, p = 0.0230 in 2010). 
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Table 8. Linear mixed model: the association of the HHI with LOS in 2002 and 2010 
 2002 2010 
 Β p-value   p-value 
Main interest     
HHI(by 100 points) 0.89 <.0001 0.25 <.0001 
Patient-level     
Gender     
Male     
Female 0.49 <.0001 0.43 <.0001 
Age     
Less than 40      
40~64 0.94 <.0001 1.08 <.0001 
65 and more 2.09 <.0001 1.87 <.0001 
Income     
Medical aid     
20% and less -0.56 0.2608 -1.61 <.0001 
21~40% -0.28 0.5697 -2.78 <.0001 
41~60% -0.37 0.4527 -1.69 <.0001 
61~80% -1.18 0.0172 -2.35 <.0001 
81% and more -1.00 0.0444 -3.15 <.0001 
Comorbidity     
No     
Yes 5.37 <.0001 4.79 <.0001 
Procedure     
Nonsurgery     
Surgery 6.04 <.0001 11.02 <.0001 
Hospital-level     
Hospital classification     
Teaching hospital 
or general hospital 
    
Small hospital -2.01 <.0001 -0.72 <.0001 
Ownership status     
Public     
Private 1.76 <.0001 -0.56 <.0001 
Number of beds     
30~300     
301~500 0.04 0.8099 3.44 <.0001 
501~1000 1.91 <.0001 1.86 <.0001 
1001~1500 3.39 <.0001 1.78 <.0001 
1500 and more 0.07 0.7496 2.90 <.0001 
Number of doctors -0.16 0.0008 -0.51 <.0001 
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Table 8. (continued) 
 2002 2010 
 Β p-value Β p-value 
CT     
No     
Yes 0.17 0.6320 0.19 0.0003 
MRI     
No     
Yes -0.35 0.0081 0.91 <.0001 
Regional-level     
Number of beds in clinic 
(per 1000 persons) 
-0.36 0.0243 0.19 0.1182 
Number of doctors  
(per 1000 persons) 
1.24 <.0001 0.37 0.0230 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -３４- 
 
4.3. Subgroup analysis 
4.3.1. Linear mixed-model analysis for DLS disease without 
comorbidity 
This study conducted a linear mixed model for DLS disease without comorbidity. 
Tables 9 and 10 show the association of the HHI with charges and LOS for patients 
without comorbidity in 2002 and 2010. The association between the HHI and charges (in 
1,000 won) in 2002 and 2010 is indicated in Table 9. This association increased 
significantly over the period (  = 42.08, p = 0.0005 in 2002;   = 308.24, p < .0001 in 
2010), similar to the association between the HHI and higher charges as in Table 7. 
However, charges were lower for patients 65 years of age or older without comorbidity 
than for others (  = -278.99, p < .0001 in 2002;   = -75.32, p < .0001 in 2010). The result 
differed from that for all patients with DLS disease. Total charges showed a significant 
association with surgery procedures (  = 7,655.00, p < .0001 in 2002;   = 4,175.84, p 
< .0001 in 2010), and total charges for DLS patients without comorbidity admitted to 
small hospitals were higher than those admitted to teaching or general hospitals in 2002 
and 2010 (  = 309.47, p < .0001 in 2002;   = 375.15, p < .0001 in 2010). 
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Table 9. Linear mixed model: association of the HHI with charges (in 1,000 won) for 
patients without comorbidity in 2002 and 2010 
 2002 2010 
 Β p-value Β p-value 
Main interest     
HHI(by 100 points) 42.08 0.0005 308.24 <.0001 
Patient-level     
Gender     
Male     
Female -159.28 <.0001 -134.14 <.0001 
Age     
Less than 40      
40~64 -25.02 0.0768 33.83 <.0001 
65 and more -278.99 <.0001 -75.32 <.0001 
Income     
Medical aid     
20% and less -40.21 0.6630 488.95 <.0001 
21~40% 175.86 0.0544 795.59 <.0001 
41~60% 234.54 0.0104 485.83 <.0001 
61~80% -89.11 0.3270 495.71 <.0001 
81% and more 10.94 0.9043 405.31 0.0002 
Procedure     
Nonsurgery     
Surgery 7655.00 <.0001 4175.84 <.0001 
Hospital-level     
Hospital classification     
Teaching hospital 
or general hospital 
    
Small hospital 309.47 <.0001 375.15 <.0001 
Ownership status     
Public     
Private -1652.80 <.0001 461.69 <.0001 
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Table 9. (continued) 
 2002 2010 
 Β p-value Β p-value 
Number of beds     
30~300     
301~500 -103.46 0.0119 88.09 <.0001 
501~1000 -105.92 0.0060 149.24 <.0001 
1001~1500 137.81 0.0017 -310.13 <.0001 
1500 and more -0.24 0.9963 493.50 <.0001 
Number of doctors 140.99 <.0001 233.81 <.0001 
CT     
No     
Yes 107.28 0.0695 -52.47 0.0001 
MRI     
No     
Yes 19.85 0.4847 -43.57 0.0022 
Regional-level     
Number of beds in clinic 
(per 1000 persons) 
-18.46 0.5716 -665.48 <.0001 
Number of doctors  
(per 1000 persons) 
-620.47 <.0001 923.44 <.0001 
 
Table 10 shows the association of the HHI with LOS for patients without comorbidity 
in 2002 and 2010. The HHI showed a significant association with LOS in 2010 (  = 0.40, 
p < .0001). LOS was lower for patients 65 years of age or older without comorbidity 
compared with patients less than 40 years of age (  = -1.50, p < .0001 in 2002;   = -0.86, 
p < .0001 in 2010). For patients without comorbidity, LOS was lower for patients 65 
years of age compared with patients 40 years of age or younger. However, for all patients, 
LOS was higher for the former group than for the latter one. LOS was significantly higher 
for surgery procedures in both years (  = 9.48, p = 0.0002 in 2002;   = 8.32, p = 0.0442 
in 2010).  
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Table 10. Linear mixed model: association of the HHI with LOS for patients without 
comorbidity in 2002 and 2010 
 2002 2010 
   p-value   p-value 
Main interest     
HHI(by 100 points) 0.02 0.7453 0.40 <.0001 
Patient-level     
Gender     
Male     
Female -0.48 <.0001 -0.55 <.0001 
Age     
Less than 40      
40~64 -0.40 <.0001 -0.09 0.0100 
65 and more -1.50 <.0001 -0.86 <.0001 
Income     
Medical aid     
20% and less 0.37 0.3056 2.05 <.0001 
21~40% 0.28 0.4239 3.42 <.0001 
41~60% 1.27 0.0003 2.03 <.0001 
61~80% -0.14 0.6965 1.94 <.0001 
81% and more 0.36 0.3012 1.73 0.0004 
Procedure     
Nonsurgery     
Surgery 9.48 0.0002 8.32 0.0442 
Hospital-level     
Hospital classification     
Teaching hospital 
or general hospital 
    
Small hospital -0.37 0.0033 0.92 <.0001 
Ownership status     
Public     
Private -4.70 <.0001 2.53 <.0001 
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Table 10. (continued) 
 2002 2010 
   p-value   p-value 
Number of beds     
30~300     
301~500 -0.45 0.0048 1.97 <.0001 
501~1000 -0.17 0.2595 1.36 <.0001 
1001~1500 0.11 0.5005 0.32 0.0055 
1500 and more -0.05 0.7992 2.24 <.0001 
Number of doctors -0.06 0.1293 0.12 <.0001 
CT     
No     
Yes 0.23 0.3241 -0.37 <.0001 
MRI     
No     
Yes -1.29 <.0001 -0.80 <.0001 
Regional-level     
Number of beds in clinic 
(per 1000 persons) 
1.24 <.0001 -1.52 <.0001 
Number of doctors  
(per 1000 persons) 
-4.03 <.0001 2.42 <.0001 
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4.3.2. Linear mixed-model analysis for DLS disease without 
comorbidity depending on the number of beds 
 
We conducted a linear mixed-model analysis for patients without comorbidity using 
the number of beds divided into 300 beds or less and more than 300 beds. Tables 11–14 
show the results of our linear mixed-model analysis depending on the number of beds. 
The association between HHI and charges (in 1,000 won) for hospitals with 300 beds or 
less in 2002 and 2010 are indicated in Table 11. Lower competition (i.e., higher HHI) 
showed a significant association with lower charges for hospitals with 300 beds or less in 
2002 and 2010 (  = -39.63, p = 0.0086 in 2002;   = -144.99, p < .0001 in 2010). In 
addition, the negative association between the HHI and charges for hospitals with 300 
beds or less increased significantly between 2002 and 2010. Table 12 shows the 
association between the HHI and charges for hospitals with more than 300 beds in 2002 
and 2010. However, lower competition (higher HHI) showed an association with higher 
charges for hospitals with more than 300 beds in 2002 and 2010 (  = 52.68, p = 0.0089 in 
2002;   = 881.77, p < .0001 in 2010). Furthermore, the association between the HHI and 
charges for such hospitals increased significantly between 2002 and 2010. The 
association between the HHI and LOS for hospitals with 300 beds or less in 2002 and 
2010 is shown in Table 13. Lower competition (higher HHI) showed a significant 
association with shorter LOS for hospitals with 300 beds or less in 2002 and 2010 (  = -
0.12, p = 0.0462 in 2002;   = -0.69, p < .0001 in 2010). In addition, the association 
between the HHI and LOS for such hospitals increased between 2002 and 2010. Table 14 
shows the association between the HHI and LOS for hospitals with more than 300 beds in 
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2002 and 2010. Lower competition (higher HHI) showed a significant association with 
shorter LOS for hospitals with more than 300 beds in 2002 (  = -0.19, p = 0.0105), but 
lower competition (higher HHI) showed a significant association with longer LOS for 
hospitals with more than 300 beds in 2010 (  = 1.64, p < .0001). 
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Table 11. Linear mixed model: the association between the HHI and charges (in 1,000 
won) for hospitals with 300 beds or less in 2002 and 2010 
 2002 2010 
 Β p-value   p-value 
Main interest     
HHI(by 100 points) -39.63 0.0086 -144.99 <.0001 
Patient-level     
Gender     
Male     
Female -195.93 <.0001 -117.45 <.0001 
Age     
Less than 40      
40~64 -185.33 <.0001 -18.83 0.0004 
65 and more -277.36 <.0001 -138.98 <.0001 
Income     
Medical aid     
20% and less 109.58 0.7934 308.10 0.0002 
21~40% 419.15 0.3164 392.61 <.0001 
41~60% 36.52 0.9304 333.30 <.0001 
61~80% 143.30 0.7318 328.32 <.0001 
81% and more 81.79 0.8449 276.81 0.0009 
Hospital-level     
Number of doctors 140.12 <.0001 20.02 <.0001 
Regional-level     
Number of beds in clinic 
(per 1000 persons) 
247.70 <.0001 156.02 <.0001 
Number of doctors  
(per 1000 persons) 
-882.47 <.0001 0.50 0.9882 
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Table 12. Linear mixed model: the association between the HHI and charges (in 1,000 
won) for hospitals with more than 300 beds in 2002 and 2010 
 2002 2010 
 Β p-value   p-value 
Main interest     
HHI(by 100 points) 52.68 0.0089 881.77 <.0001 
Patient-level     
Gender     
Male     
Female -153.78 <.0001 -182.83 <.0001 
Age     
Less than 40      
40~64 146.62 <.0001 139.69 <.0001 
65 and more -319.14 <.0001 -51.15 0.0510 
Income     
Medical aid     
20% and less 68.01 0.5212 830.62 0.0004 
21~40% 185.20 0.0765 1452.12 <.0001 
41~60% 706.56 <.0001 727.99 0.0019 
61~80% -23.09 0.8233 770.40 0.0010 
81% and more 248.79 0.0161 693.14 0.0031 
Hospital-level     
Number of doctors 127.96 <.0001 353.44 <.0001 
Regional-level     
Number of beds in clinic 
(per 1000 persons) 
-296.98 <.0001 -1470.41 <.0001 
Number of doctors  
(per 1000 persons) 
-331.42 0.0015 1501.41 <.0001 
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Table 13. Linear mixed model: the association between the HHI and the LOS for 
hospitals with 300 beds or less in 2002 and 2010 
 2002 2010 
   p-value   p-value 
Main interest     
HHI(by 100 points) -0.12 0.0462 -0.69 <.0001 
Patient-level     
Gender     
Male     
Female -0.25 0.0002 -0.53 <.0001 
Age     
Less than 40      
40~64 -0.72 <.0001 -0.21 <.0001 
65 and more -1.10 <.0001 -1.13 <.0001 
Income     
Medical aid     
20% and less 3.27 0.0536 1.07 0.0802 
21~40% 3.07 0.0699 1.86 0.0023 
41~60% 3.64 0.0319 1.08 0.0774 
61~80% 3.16 0.0617 1.02 0.0962 
81% and more 3.04 0.0731 0.86 0.1599 
Hospital-level     
Number of doctors -0.65 <.0001 -0.86 <.0001 
Regional-level     
Number of beds in clinic 
(per 1000 persons) 
2.60 <.0001 -0.05 0.7773 
Number of doctors  
(per 1000 persons) 
-5.81 <.0001 1.05 <.0001 
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Table 14. Linear mixed model: the association between the HHI and LOS for hospitals 
with more than 300 beds in 2002 and 2010 
 2002 2010 
   p-value   p-value 
Main interest     
HHI(by 100 points) -0.19 0.0105 1.64 <.0001 
Patient-level     
Gender     
Male     
Female -0.85 <.0001 -0.61 <.0001 
Age     
Less than 40      
40~64 -0.07 0.4293 0.08 0.3198 
65 and more -1.80 <.0001 -0.68 <.0001 
Income     
Medical aid     
20% and less 0.44 0.2568 3.39 <.0001 
21~40% 0.74 0.0531 5.48 <.0001 
41~60% 2.14 <.0001 3.18 <.0001 
61~80% -0.07 0.8476 3.02 0.0002 
81% and more 0.83 0.0275 2.94 0.0002 
Hospital-level     
Number of doctors 0.17 <.0001 0.43 <.0001 
Regional-level     
Number of beds in clinic 
(per 1000 persons) 
0.07 0.6810 -1.95 <.0001 
Number of doctors  
(per 1000 persons) 
-3.46 <.0001 1.29 0.0026 
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5. Discussion  
 
5.1. Discussion on the study methods and limitations  
There are several limitations associated with this study. First, although this study 
attempted to observe changes in the effects of market competition by reviewing two 
discrete periods (i.e., 2002 and 2010), it has a cross-sectional study design. Thus, there is 
a causal inference relationship. Second, only patients with DLS disease were included in 
this study; thus, the actual hospital market competition might be under- or overestimated. 
Furthermore, because diagnosis codes higher than four digits were inaccurate, assigning 
an adjustment weight to comorbidity level was not possible. Thus, this study used an 
indicator for whether comorbidity existed as its severity adjustment. Future studies may 
use the Charlson Comorbidity Index (CCI) for severity adjustments. Another limitation is 
that hospital financial statements were not included in the data, which may have 
influenced the outcome variables of this study. In addition, our definition of the hospital 
market may be a significant limitation of this study. Because 10 health service areas are 
the only official classification of hospital markets, this study used these 10 health service 
areas to define hospital markets and to adjust regional-level variables; however, using 
these health service areas may have weakened our findings. Lastly, a lack of data on 
hospital bed occupancy rates limited our analysis of the effects of hospital competition on 
charges and LOS. Therefore, this study grouped hospitals by number of beds. Hospital 
sizes were divided into 300 beds or less (small hospital) and more than 300 beds (large 
hospital) in this study. No official classification of hospital size exists, but the point of 
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300 beds is generally used for the standard classification of hospital size, which is the 
less-refined approach used in this study. Future works may apply the more refined 
approach of hospital bed occupancy rate to improve on our paper. Despite these 
limitations, this is an important empirical study for the evaluation of the influence of 
hospital market competition on charges and LOS. 
 
5.2. Discussion of the results 
This paper examined the influence of hospital competition on charges and LOS for 
DLS disease. Charges and LOS are considered an indicator of hospital efficiency (OECD, 
2012). Our finding that increased hospital competition is related to lower charges and 
shorter LOS is similar to the previous studies of Melnick and Zwanziger (1988), Melnick 
et al. (1992), Propper (1996), Rivers and Fottler (2004), and Park (2006). In addition, the 
results of this study indicate that the magnitude of the effects of market competition on 
charges and LOS increased between 2002 and 2010. These findings were conceptualized 
using the S–C–P framework. 
The results of the subgroup analysis for patients without comorbidity and those of 
analysis for all patients pointed in the same direction. After excluding comorbidity, the 
effects of the HHI on charges and LOS were low in 2002. However, these effects for 
patients without comorbidity increased in 2010. 
In addition, this study conducted an analysis for patients without comorbidity by 
grouping the number of beds into 300 beds or less and more than 300 beds. For hospitals 
with 300 beds or less, higher competition is associated with increases in charges and LOS 
in both 2002 and 2010. This result showed that market competition did not lead to 
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efficiency for small hospitals. Moreover, the magnitude of the side effects of market 
competition increased between 2002 and 2010. By contrast, in hospitals with more than 
300 beds, higher market competition reduced charges over time. Furthermore, the 
association between the HHI and charges increased between 2002 and 2010. In terms of 
LOS for large hospitals, increased market competition in 2002 led to longer LOS but that 
in 2010 led to shorter LOS. During the period analyzed in this study, there have been 
efforts to reduce the average LOS in Korea. According to the “OECD Health Data 2014” 
report, Korea reduced its average LOS from 17.5 days in 2008 to 16.1 days in 2012. The 
average LOS of 16.1 days in Korea is much longer than the OECD average of 7.4 days, 
but the reduction in average LOS of 1.4 days in Korea was greater than that of the OECD 
average of 0.5 days between 2008 and 2012 (OECD, 2014). In addition, since the mid-
2000s, enhancing the benefit coverage for national health insurance has affected the 
centralization of patients to large hospitals (KIHASA, 2013). The concentration of 
patients in large hospitals led to a decrease in LOS in large hospitals. These changes 
might have affected the association between the HHI and LOS for hospitals with more 
than 300 beds.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
This study found that higher competition is related to lower hospital charges and LOS. 
The results of this study support the notion that competition leads to improved efficiency. 
Between 2002 and 2010, overall changes in the market structure may have affected the 
relationship between competition and DLS treatment outcomes (e.g., charges and LOS). 
However, improved efficiency through market competition was not observed among 
small hospitals, which raises concerns for policymakers. It is suggested that policy 
analysts and researchers continue to monitor the potential adverse efficiency of market 
competition, particularly among small facilities. 
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국문요약 
병원시장 경쟁이 진료비 및 재원일수에 미치는 영향 
 
국내에서 요추질환 환자의 의료이용과 진료비가 지속적으로 증가하고 있
다. 게다가 병원형태와 재원일수에 따라 요추수술의 입원건당 진료비의 차이
가 크다. 그 동안에 병원과 전문병원의 증가에 의한 경쟁 심화가 최근 요추수
술 현황에 영향을 미쳤을 것이다. 하지만 아직 병원시장 경쟁이 병원 효율성
에 영향을 미쳤을 것이라는 실증적 근거가 부족하다.  
이 연구는 병원시장 경쟁이 진료비 및 재원일수와 관련이 있는지 분석하
였다. 시장구조가 의료공급자의 행태에 영향을 미치고 궁극적으로 성과에 영
향을 준다고 가정하는 산업조직론의 개념적 틀을 연구모형으로 적용하였다. 
분석을 위해 2002년도, 2010년도 국민건강보험 표본코호트 자료와 2002년도, 
2010년도 보건복지부∙한국보건사회연구원 환자조사 퇴원환자자료를 바탕으로 
퇴행성 요추질환 입원환자 총 24768명 (2002년 4891명, 2010년 19877명)을 대
상으로 하였다. 경쟁은 HHI(Hirschmann-Herfindal Index)에 의해서 측정되었
다. 시장구조-시장행태-시장성과 (S-C-P) 모형을 적용하여 혼란변수를 보정한 
후, 병원 경쟁을 주요 독립변수로 진료비와 재원일수를 종속변수로 선형혼합
모형을 이용하여 분석하였다.  
퇴행성 요추환자의 총 진료비 평균은 2002년에 306,351원, 2010년에 
250,723원이었고, 재원일수의 평균은 2002년 2.98일, 2010년 2.79일이었다.  
선형혼합모형 분석 결과 HHI는 퇴행성 요추환자의 진료비 및 재원일수와 관련
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이 있다. HHI가 증가할수록 2002년과 2010년에 퇴행성 요추질환 입원환자의 
진료비(단위: 1000원)가 통계적으로 유의하게 증가했다. 또한 HHI가 증가할수
록 2002년과 2010년에 해당질환 입원환자의 재원일수가 유의하게 증가하였다. 
경쟁수준이 높을수록 진료비와 재원일수를 감소시켰다. 게다가 동반질환이 없
는 환자들만을 대상으로 분석했을 때에도 앞서 분석한 결과와 같은 방향을 나
타냈다. 300병상 이하의 병원에서는 경쟁 수준이 높을수록 2002년과 2010년에 
진료비와 재원일수가 증가했다. 반면에, 300병상 초과 병원에서는 2002년과 
2010년에 경쟁수준이 높을수록 진료비와 재원일수를 감소시켰다.  
이러한 결과를 토대로 병원 경쟁과 같은 시장구조가 진료비, 재원일수 병
원 효율성에 영향을 미친다는 결론을 내릴 수 있었다. 그러므로 병원성과에 
영향을 주는 시장구조의 변화에 대한 정부의 관심이 요구된다. 또한 향후 경
쟁이 환자 만족도와 같은 성과에 미치는 효과에 대한 보다 상세한 분석이 필
요하다.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
핵심어: 병원경쟁, Hirschmann-Herfindal Index, 진료비, 재원일수 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics: Patients without Comorbidity in 2002 and 2010 
 2002 2010 
 n(%) Mean SD n(%) Mean SD 
Patient-level     
Charges
a 
 88,078 
 270,863 
 99,096 
           
Length of stay  1.78 
 2.08 
 1.82 
 2.32 
Gender     
Male 1,114 
(50.45) 
 2,259 
(46.23) 
 
Female 1,094 
(49.55) 
 3,441 
(53.77) 
 
Age     
Less than 40  729 
(33.02) 
 1,632 
(25.50) 
 
40~64 1,135 
(51.40) 
 3,152 
(49.25) 
 
65 and more 344 
(15.58) 
 1,616 
(25.25) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -６０- 
 
 
Table A.1. (continued) 
 
2002 2010 
 
n(%) Mean SD n(%) Mean SD 
Income     
Medical aid 6 
(0.27) 
 14 
(0.22) 
 
20% and less 252 
(11.41) 
 798 
(12.47) 
 
21~40% 341 
(15.44) 
 860 
(13.44) 
 
41~60% 398 
(18.03) 
 1,155 
(18.05) 
 
61~80% 536 
(24.28) 
 1,518 
(23.72) 
 
81% and more 675 
(30.57) 
 2,055 
(32.11) 
 
Procedure
b 
    
Nonsurgery 20,660 
(99.99) 
 71187 
(100.00) 
 
Surgery 2 
(0.01) 
 1 
(0.00) 
 
Hospital-level     
The number of patients by 
hospital classification 
    
Teaching hospital 
or general hospital 
1,361 
(61.64) 
 2,522 
(39.41) 
 
Small hospital 847 
(38.36) 
 3,878 
(60.59) 
 
The number of patients by 
ownership status 
    
Public 31 
(1.40) 
 98 
(1.53) 
 
Private 2,177 
(98.60) 
 6,302 
(98.47) 
 
 
 -６１- 
 
 
Table A.1. (continued) 
 2002 2010 
 n(%) Mean SD n(%) Mean SD 
The number of patients by 
bed size 
    
30~300 974 
(44.11) 
 4,368 
(68.25) 
 
301~500 150 
(6.79) 
 395 
(6.17) 
 
501~1000 675 
(30.57) 
 1,304 
(16.16) 
 
1001~1500 267 
(12.09) 
 329 
(5.14) 
 
1500 and more 142 
(6.43) 
 274 
(4.28) 
 
The number of doctors  147.85 
 192.68 
 116.24 
 258.72 
The number of patients by 
existence of CT 
    
No 32 
(1.45) 
 651 
(10.17) 
 
Yes 2,176 
(98.55) 
 5,749 
(89.83) 
 
The number of patients by 
existence of MRI 
    
No 214 
(9.69) 
 726 
(11.34) 
 
Yes 1,994 
(90.31) 
 5,674 
(88.66) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -６２- 
 
Table A.1. (continued) 
 2002 2010 
 n(%) Mean SD n(%) Mean SD 
Market structure      
HHI(by 100 points)  3.26 
 2.88 
 2.26 
 1.72 
The number of beds in clinic 
(per 1000 persons) 
 1.55 
 0.67 
 1.51 
 0.60 
The number of doctors  
(per 1000 persons) 
 0.68 
 0.20 
 0.94 
 0.27 
Number of patients 2,208 
(100) 
 6,400 
(100) 
 
a
Unit: Korean Won. 
b
Unit: number of surgery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -６３- 
 
Table A.2. Descriptive statistics: Patients without Comorbidity in small hospitals in 2002 
and 2010 
 2002 2010 
 n(%) Mean SD n(%) Mean SD 
Patient-level     
Charges
a 
 102,626 
 251,501 
 84,041 
 213,497 
Length of stay  1.98 
 2.30 
 1.90 
 2.39 
Gender     
Male 487 
(48.94) 
 2,084 
(46.10) 
 
Female 508 
(51.06) 
 2,437 
(53.90) 
 
Age     
Less than 40  369 
(37.09) 
 1,266 
(28.00) 
 
40~64 501 
(50.35) 
 2,291 
(50.67) 
 
65 and more 125 
(12.56) 
 964 
(21.32) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -６４- 
 
Table A.2. (continued) 
 
2002 2010 
 
n(%) Mean SD n(%) Mean SD 
Income     
Medical aid 2 
(0.20) 
 8 
(0.18) 
 
20% and less 112 
(11.26) 
 575 
(12.72) 
 
21~40% 173 
(17.39) 
 612 
(13.54) 
 
41~60% 189 
(18.99) 
 853 
(18.87) 
 
61~80% 244 
(24.52) 
 1,087 
(24.04) 
 
81% and more 275 
(27.64) 
 1,386 
(30.66) 
 
Hospital-level     
The number of doctors  21.06 
 17.02 
 12.52 
 10.81 
Market structure      
HHI(by 100 points)  3.22 
       
 2.26 
 1.70 
The number of beds in clinic 
(per 1000 persons) 
 1.49 
       
 1.53 
 0.61 
The number of doctors  
(per 1000 persons) 
 0.68 
 0.20 
 0.95 
 0.27 
Number of patients 995 
(100) 
 4,521 
(100) 
 
a
Unit: Korean Won. 
 
 
 
 
 -６５- 
 
Table A.3. Descriptive statistics: Patients without Comorbidity in large hospitals in 2002 
and 2010 
 2002 2010 
 n(%) Mean SD n(%) Mean SD 
Patient-level     
Charges
a 
 76,041 
 284,169 
 127,999 
 495,951 
Length of stay  1.60 
 1.85 
 1.61 
 2.11 
Gender     
Male 647 
(51.64) 
 987 
(47.70) 
 
Female 606 
(48.36) 
 1,082 
(52.30) 
 
Age     
Less than 40  372 
(29.69) 
 418 
(20.20) 
 
40~64 656 
(52.35) 
 950 
(45.92) 
 
65 and more 225 
(17.96) 
 701 
(33.88) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -６６- 
 
Table A.3. (continued) 
 
2002 2010 
 
n(%) Mean SD n(%) Mean SD 
Income     
Medical aid 4 
(0.32) 
 8 
(0.39) 
 
20% and less 142 
(11.33) 
 245 
(11.84) 
 
21~40% 176 
(14.05) 
 273 
(13.19) 
 
41~60% 218 
(17.40) 
 324 
(15.66) 
 
61~80% 300 
(23.94) 
 479 
(23.15) 
 
81% and more 413 
(32.96) 
 740 
(35.77) 
 
Hospital-level     
The number of doctors  247.03 
 207.66 
 336.29 
 368.91 
Market structure      
HHI(by 100 points)  3.29 
 2.82 
 2.28 
 1.79 
The number of beds in clinic 
(per 1000 persons) 
 1.61 
       
 1.47 
 0.60 
The number of doctors  
(per 1000 persons) 
 0.69 
 0.20 
 0.92 
       
Number of patients 1,253 
(100) 
 2,069 
(100) 
 
a
Unit: Korean Won. 
 
 
 
 
